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ABSTRACT
Background - Software companies increasingly rely on static anal-
ysis tools to detect potential bugs and security vulnerabilities in
their software products. In the past decade, more and more com-
mercial and open-source static analysis tools have been developed
and are maintained. Each tool comes with its own reporting for-
mat, preventing an easy integration of multiple analysis tools in a
single interface, such as the Static Analysis Server Protocol (Sasp).
In 2017, a collaborative effort in industry, including Microsoft and
GrammaTech, has proposed the Static Analysis Results Interchange
Format (Sarif) to address this issue. Sarif is a standardized format
in which static analysis warnings can be encoded, to allow the
import and export of analysis reports between different tools.
Purpose - This paper explains the Sarif format through exam-
ples and presents a proof of concept of the connector that allows the
static analysis tool CogniCrypt to generate and export its results
in Sarif format.
Design/Approach - We conduct a cross-sectional study be-
tween the SARIF format and CogniCrypt’s output format before
detailing the implementation of the connector. The study aims to
find the components of interest in CogniCrypt that the Sarif
export module can complete.
Originality/Value - The integration of Sarif into CogniCrypt
described in this paper can be reused to integrate Sarif into other
static analysis tools.
Conclusion - After detailing the Sarif format, we present an
initial implementation to integrate Sarif into CogniCrypt. After
taking advantage of all the features provided by Sarif, CogniCrypt
will be able to support Sasp.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Software security engineering; Cryptog-
raphy; • Software and its engineering→ Source code generation;
Parsers; Software maintenance tools.
KEYWORDS
Static Analysis, Static Analysis Results Interchange Format, SARIF,
Static Analysis Server Protocol, SASP
1 INTRODUCTION
In order to detect errors in their programs, software companies
and individual developers use static analysis tools to analyze their
software. From the correctness of the program, to security vul-
nerabilities, to compliance with given standards, to performance,
static analysis is widely used in practice. Current tools typically
generate reports in their own format for their own interface, or
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Figure 1: An illustration of Sasp integrated with static anal-
ysis clients. When a client (e.g., Eclipse), requests static anal-
ysis results from SASP (1), SASP requests results from all
other clients (2a–c). It receives them (3a–c), and sends the
aggregated report back to Eclipse (4).
provide means to export general reports in XML or PDF format
for example. As a result, software developers often experience a
significant overhead parsing and aggregating the reports generated
by different analysis tools in order to obtain one complete report.
To address this problem, CA Technologies [14], Cryptsoft [9], Fire-
Eye [2], GrammaTech [5], Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) [6],
Micro Focus [3], Microsoft [7], Semmle [13], and others, proposed
a common reporting format for all static analysis tools, the Static
Analysis Results Interchange Format, abbreviated as Sarif.
Sarif is a standard developed under OASIS [4]. The technical
committee of Sarif includes members from several static analysis
tool vendors, including GrammaTech and other large-scale users [4].
Sarif is a JSON-based format designed to not only report the results
of an analysis but also its metadata, including schema, URI, and
version. It has been created with the goal of unifying the output
format of different static analysis tools, making it easy to integrate
the reports into a single interface, which is the main objective of
Static Analysis Server Protocol (Sasp) [4].
Sasp acts as a service where clients, such as the Eclipse Integrated
Development Environment (IDE)1, IntelliJ IDEA2, or Visual Studio
Code3 can request static analysis results obtained from other anal-
ysis tools for a given program to analyze, as illustrated in Figure 1.
For such a service to respond to a query quickly, it is necessary
to enforce a common output standard to aggregate all analysis
warnings results efficiently. Sasp achieves this by leveraging Sarif.
We explore how to make an analysis tool support Sarif, in order
to eventually incorporate it in the Sasp system, thus enabling inter-
operability and potential integration with other static analysis tools.
1https://www.eclipse.org/ide/
2https://www.jetbrains.com/idea/
3https://code.visualstudio.com/
1 public class Crypto {
2 public void getKey(int keySize) throws
↪→ NoSuchAlgorithmException{
3 KeyGenerator c = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES");
4 if (keySize > 0)
5 c.init (512);
6 else
7 c.generateKey ();
8 c.generateKey ();
9 }
10 }
Listing 1: Code example containing a ConstraintError
and a TypestateError
In particular, we focus on CogniCrypt [12], a static analysis tool
that detects misuses of cryptographic APIs in Java programs. The
current version of CogniCrypt returns its results in its own format,
which is used to display warning traces in Eclipse. CogniCrypt is
implemented as an Eclipse plugin, and provides software developers
with two main functionalities:
• generating secure implementations of common crypto-
graphic programming tasks,
• and analyzing developer code in the IDE and reporting ex-
isting misuses of cryptographic libraries.
In this paper, we first present CogniCrypt’s original reporting
format in Section 2. We then detail the Sarif format and explain
its structure and syntax in Section 3. Then, Section 4 describes our
implementation of the connector that exports CogniCrypt results
in Sarif format. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the outcomes of this
paper and presents future work.
2 THE COGNICRYPT REPORT FORMAT
Cryptography is used for many different purposes. From hashing
to encrypting, complex cryptographic libraries are used in many
applications. However, using those libraries is not straightforward.
Recent studies indicate that software developers have limited to no
knowledge on the usage of APIs of cryptographic libraries. Lazar
et al. [15] carried out an investigation on 269 cryptography related
vulnerabilities and found that 83% of them resulted from software
application developers misusing the cryptographic libraries. Nadi
et al. [11] show that most cryptographic misuses are due to the
insufficient knowledge on the library usage by the developer, and
that developers require debugging tools in their development envi-
ronments to support them.
In order to detect cryptographic API misuses, CogniCrypt uses
a set of cryptographic rules encoded in the CrySL format, a defi-
nition language that allows cryptographic experts to encode the
secure usage of cryptographic libraries in a light-weighted syntax.
CogniCrypt automatically converts those rules into an efficient
flow-sensitive and context-sensitive static data-flow analysis that
it then runs to detect the API misuses described by the rules. In its
current state, CogniCrypt contains a complete ruleset for the APIs
of the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA).
In CogniCrypt, each CrySL rule defines the correct use of a
specific Java class of a cryptography library, by encoding constraints
on usage order of API calls and parameter types. Error types and
reporting are also encoded in CrySL. When CogniCrypt analyses a
11 Findings in Java Class: Example.Crypto
12
13 in Method: void getKey(int)
14 ConstraintError violating CrySL rule for
↪→ javax.crypto.KeyGenerator (on Object
↪→ #bfd7ff31836bf8643830e32ce26e9ef95
↪→ 4d0522793ed0e9722ce44f0b255d4ef)
15 First parameter (with value 512) should be any
↪→ of {128, 192, 256}
16 at statement: virtualinvoke
↪→ r1.<javax.crypto.KeyGenerator: void
↪→ init(int)>(varReplacer29)
17 at line: 5
18
19 TypestateError violating CrySL rule for
↪→ javax.crypto.KeyGenerator (on Object
↪→ #bfd7ff31836bf8643830e32ce26e9ef95
↪→ 4d0522793ed0e9722ce44f0b255d4ef)
20 Unexpected call to method generateKey on
↪→ object of type
↪→ javax.crypto.KeyGenerator.
21 at statement: virtualinvoke
↪→ r1.<javax.crypto.KeyGenerator:
↪→ javax.crypto.SecretKey generateKey () >()
22 at line: 7
Listing 2: CogniCrypt console output for Listing 1
Java program, a listener waits for the generation of analysis results
and outputs them in the command-line as they are returned. A
developer can change the reporting format by implementing their
own custom reporting listener and using it in place of the default
command-line listener. CogniCrypt supports seven types of errors:
• ConstraintError: This type of error refers to the wrong pa-
rameters being supplied to particular method calls. For example,
calling Cipher.getInstance("AES") instead of the secure ver-
sion Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB/PKCS5Padding").
• NeverTypeOfError: This error is reported when a variable is
of an insecure type, such as a password contained in a string
instead of a char array.
• ForbiddenMethodError: This error is raised when a depre-
cated or insecure method is called, such as the constructor
PBEKeySpec(char[] password).
• TypestateError: When a call to a method is issued when it
shouldn’t be, CogniCrypt raises a TypestateError. For example,
calling Cipher.doFinal()when no call to Cipher.init() has
been issued before.
• RequiredPredicateError:This error refers to a second-degree
ConstraintError: when an object requires another object to be
used in a specific way, and this was not the case. For example,
a Cipher object receiving a hardcoded key will raise an error,
since such keys should not be hardcoded.
• ImpreciseValueExtractionError:This error is usedwhen the
analysis could not retrieve the parameter passed to a crypto-
graphic method, for example when a key size is supplied in a
configuration file instead of in the code. Since the parameter
could be faulty, an error of lesser importance is raised.
• IncompleteOperationError: This error relates to the Type-
stateError, but instead of referring to a wrong method call, it
is raised when a missing call is detected. An example is never
calling Cipher.doFinal() on a cipher object.
2
23 {
24 "version": "2.0.0",
25 "$schema":
↪→ "http://json.schemastore.org/sarif -2.0.0",
26 "runs": [{..}]
27 }
Listing 3: Root key-value pairs of Sarif
28 "runs": [{
29 "tool": {..},
30 "invocations": [{..}],
31 "files": {..},
32 "logicalLocations": {..},
33 "results": [{..}],
34 "resources": {..}
35 }]
Listing 4: Subkeys of the key runs in Sarif
We illustrate a ConstraintError and a TypestateError in Listing 1,
with CogniCrypt’s corresponding report shown in Listing 2. List-
ing 1 presents a Java method which generates a cryptographic key
using an instance of KeyGenerator. Two errors are made here: first,
init() of KeyGenerator is called using an incorrect parameter:
512 instead of the secure 128, 192, or 256 values. Second, along
the else path, the key generator object is never initialized before
generateKey() is called. Using the CrySL rules that describe the
usage of KeyGenerator, CogniCrypt thus detects the two errors
as a ConstraintError and a TypestateError. We show the correspond-
ing CrySL rules in Appendix A.1.
When reporting an error, CogniCrypt provides:
• The error type.
• The error location, as a line number and file name.
• A customized error message. For example, for the Constrain-
tError in Listing 2, the error message contains the erroneous
first parameter of getKey(), and provides other parameters
that should be used instead.
3 THE SARIF FORMAT
We now detail the Sarif specification, with respect to reporting
warnings. The complete Sarif documentation is found online [4].
Sarif is a JSON format standard [10]. Its three main root keys–
shown in Listing 3–are: version which specifies the version of the
Sarif format, $schema which specifies the URI of the predefined
JSON schema corresponding to the version, and runs an array con-
taining the results of the analysis runs. The six main subkeys of an
individual run are shown in Listing 4.
The syntax of the runs key can be separated into two categories:
• reporting analysis results (invocations, files, results, and logi-
calLocations keys), which we detail in Section 3.1,
• analysis metadata (tool and resource keys), which we explore
in Section 3.2.
3.1 Reporting Analysis Results
In this section, we detail the invocations, files, results, and logicalLo-
cations keys and their subkeys.
36 "invocations": {
37 "commandLine": "java -cp
↪→ CryptoAnalysis -1.0.0-jar -with -
↪→ dependencies.jar
↪→ crypto.HeadlessCryptoScanner
↪→ --rulesDir=src/test/resources/
↪→ --applicationCp=CogniCryptDemoExample/
↪→ Examples.jar --sarifReport
↪→ --reportDir=CogniCrypt/reports",
38
39 "responseFiles": [{
40 "uri": "CryptoAnalysis/build/
↪→ CryptoAnalysis -jar -with -dependencies.jar",
41 }, {
42 "uri":
↪→ "CryptoAnalysis/src/test/resources /",
43 }, {
44 "uri": "CryptoAnalysisTargets/
↪→ CogniCryptDemoExample/
↪→ Examples.jar"
45 }],
46 "startTime": "2016-07-16T14:18:25Z",
47 "endTime": "2016-07-16T14:19:01Z",
48 "fileName": "CryptoAnalysis/build/
↪→ CryptoAnalysis -jar -with -dependencies.jar",
49 "workingDirectory": "/home/CryptoAnalysis /",
50 "environmentVariables": {
51 "PATH": "..",
52 "HOME": "..",
53 },
54 "configurationNotifications": [{
55 "level": "error",
56 "message": {
57 "text": "ERROR StatusLogger No Log4j 2
↪→ configuration file found. Using
↪→ default configuration (logging only
↪→ errors to the console)."
58 }
59 }],
60 "toolNotifications": [{
61 "level": "note",
62 "message": {
63 "text": "Finished initializing soot."
64 }
65 }, {
66 "level": "warning",
67 "message": {
68 "text": "Couldn 't find any method for
↪→ CryptSLMethod: keyMaterial =
↪→ javax.crypto.SecretKey. getEncoded ();"
69 },
70 }, {
71 "level": "note",
72 "message": {
73 "text": "Static Analysis took 1 seconds !."
74 }
75 }]
76 }
Listing 5: Subkeys of the key invocations in Sarif
invocations. The invocations key describes the invocation infor-
mation of the static analysis tool that was run. Invocation informa-
tion mainly includes the start time of the analysis, the end time of
the analysis, the environmental variables that are used to run the
analysis, the command that is used to invoke the analysis, and the
notifications displayed during the analysis. Those notifications are
3
77 "files": {
78 "collections/list.cpp": {
79 "mimeType": "text/x-c",
80 "length": 980,
81 },
82 "app.zip#/docs/intro.docx": {
83 "uri": "/docs/intro.docx",
84 "mimeType":"wordprocessingml.document",
85 "parentKey": "app.zip",
86 "length": 4050
87 }
88 }
Listing 6: Subkeys of the key files in Sarif
89 "logicalLocations": {
90 "namespaceA::namespaceB::classC": {
91 "name": "classC",
92 "kind": "type",
93 "parentKey": "namespaceA::namespaceB"
94 },
95 "namespaceA::namespaceB": {
96 "name": "namespaceB",
97 "kind": "namespace"
98 "parentKey": "namespaceA"
99 },
100 "namespaceA": {
101 "name": "namespaceA",
102 "kind": "namespace"
103 }
104 }
Listing 7: Subkeys of the key logicalLocations in Sarif
categorized into configuration notifications and tool notifications.
The former contain notification objects describing the conditions
relevant to the tool configuration, while the latter describe the run-
time environment after the static analysis is invoked. A snippet of
a CogniCrypt invocation object is shown in Listing 5.
files. The files key contains the information of all the files rele-
vant to the run: the files in which analysis results were detected, or
all files examined by the analysis tool. In some cases, a file might be
nested inside another file (for example, in a compressed container),
which is then referred to as its parent. In the case of nested files, the
parent’s name is separated from nested fragment with the character,
“#”. The nested fragment then starts with “/”. An example where the
file “intro.docx” is located in the file “app.zip” is shown in Listing 6.
logicalLocations. The optional key logicalLocations is used in
case the analysis tool yields results that include physical location
information, (e.g., source file name, the line and column numbers)
and logical location information (e.g., namespace, type, and method
name). In some cases, a logical location might be nested in another
logical location referred to as its parent. In such cases, logicalLoca-
tions should contain properties describing each of its parents, up to
the top-level logical location. An example of a warning detected in
the C++ class namespaceA::namespaceB::classC is shown in Listing 7.
The corresponding logicalLocations object contains the properties
describing the class along with its containing namespaces.
results. Each run object contains an array of result objects, under
the key results. Each result represents a warning reported by the
105 "results": [{
106 "ruleId": "C2001",
107 "ruleMessageId": "default",
108 "richMessageId": "richText",
109 "message": {
110 "text": "Deleting member 'x' of variable 'y' may
↪→ compromise performance on subsequent
↪→ accesses of 'y'."
111 },
112 "suppressionStates": [ "suppressedExternally" ],
113 "baselineState": "existing",
114 "level": "error",
115 "analysisTarget": {
116 "uri": "collections/list.cpp",
117 },
118 "locations": [{..}],
119 "codeFlows": [{..}],
120 "stacks": [{..}],
121 "fixes": [{..}],
122 "workItemUris": [
123 "https:// github.com/example/project/issues/42",
124 "https:// github.com/example/project/issues/54"
125 ]
126 }]
Listing 8: Subkeys of the key results in Sarif
127 "locations":[{
128 "physicalLocation": {
129 "fileLocation": {
130 "uri": "collections/list.h",
131 },
132 "region": {
133 "startLine": 15,
134 "startColumn": 9,
135 "endLine": 15,
136 "endColumn": 10,
137 "charLength": 1,
138 "charOffset": 254,
139 "snippet": {
140 "text": "add_core(ptr, offset, val);\n
↪→ return ;"
141 }
142 }
143 },
144 "fullyQualifiedLogicalName":
↪→ "collections::list:add"
145 }]
Listing 9: Subkeys of the key locations in Sarif
analysis, an example of which is shown in Listing 8. We now detail
the subkeys of a run object.
• ruleId is the unique identifier of the analysis rule that was
evaluated to produce the result.
• ruleMessageId refers to a message in the metadata.
• richMessageId refers to a more descriptive message in the
metadata.
• message describes the warning. If the message is not speci-
fied, the ruleMessageId is used instead.
• baselineState describes the state of the result with respect to
a previous baseline run (i.e., new, existing, or absent).
• level indicates the severity of the result (e.g., error, warning).
4
146 "codeFlows": [{
147 "message": {
148 "text": "Path from declaration to usage"
149 },
150 "threadFlows": [
151 {
152 "id": "thread -52",
153 "locations": [
154 {
155 "step": 1,
156 "importance": "essential",
157 "message": {
158 "text": "Variable \"ptr\" declared .",
159 },
160 "location": {...
161 "region": {
162 "startLine": 15,
163 "snippet": {
164 "text": "int *ptr;"
165 },
166 }
167 },
168 },
169 "module": "platform"
170 },
171 {
172 "step": 2,
173 "importance": "essential",
174 "message": {
175 "text": "Uninitialized variable
↪→ \"ptr\" passed to
176 method \" add_core \".",
177 "richText": "Uninitialized variable
↪→ `ptr ` passed to
178 method `add_core `."
179 },
180 "location": {
181 "physicalLocation": {...
182 "region": {
183 "startLine": 25,
184 "snippet": {
185 "text": "add_core(ptr, offset,
↪→ val)"
186 }
187 }
188 },
189 },
190 }
191 ]
192 }
193 ]
194 }
195 ],
Listing 10: Subkeys of the key codeFlow in Sarif
• locations contains one or more unique location objects mark-
ing the exact location of warning, as shown in Listing 9. It
contains the physical location (e.g., file name, line and col-
umn) or the logical location (such as namespace, type, and
method name) and the region in the file where the result
is found. If the physical location information is absent, the
fullyQualifiedLogicalName property is used instead.
• codeFlows is an array of individual code flows, which describe
the execution path of the warning step by step. An example
is shown in Listing 10.
196 "stacks": [{
197 "message": {
198 "text": "Call stack resulting from usage of
↪→ uninitialized variable ."
199 },
200 "frames": [
201 {
202 "message": {
203 "text": "Exception thrown ."
204 },
205 "location": {
206 "physicalLocation": {...
207 "region": {
208 "startLine": 110,
209 "startColumn": 15
210 }
211 },
212 },
213 "threadId": 52,
214 "address": 10092852,
215 "parameters": [ "null", "0", "14" ]
216 },
217 {
218 "location": {
219 "physicalLocation": {...
220 "region": {
221 "startLine": 43,
222 "startColumn": 15
223 }
224 },
225 },
226 "threadId": 52,
227 "address": 10092176,
228 "parameters": [ "14" ]
229 },
230 {
231 "location": {
232 "physicalLocation": {...
233 "region": {
234 "startLine": 28,
235 "startColumn": 9
236 }
237 },
238 },
239 "threadId": 52,
240 "address": 10091200,
241 }
242 ]
243 }
244 ],
Listing 11: Subkeys of the key stacks in Sarif
• stacks is an array of call-stack frames created by the analy-
sis tool. Each stack frame contains location information to
the call-stack object, a thread id, parameter values, memory
addresses, etc. This is illustrated in Listing 11.
• fixes is an array of fix suggestions. For each file in a fix object,
the format describes regions that can be removed and new
contents to be added. An example is found in Listing 12.
• workItemUris is an array of URIs to existing work items
associated with the warning. Work items can be GitHub
issues or JIRA tickets for example.
5
245 "fixes": [{
246 "description": {
247 "text": "Initialize the variable to null"
248 },
249 "fileChanges": [{
250 "fileLocation": {
251 "uri": "collections/list.h",
252 },
253 "replacements": [{
254 "deletedRegion": {
255 "startLine": 42
256 },
257 "insertedContent": {
258 "text": "A different line\n"
259 }
260 }]
261 }]
262 }]
Listing 12: Subkeys of the key fixes in Sarif
3.2 Metadata
We now detail the tool and resources keys and their subkeys, which
are used in Sarif to store analysis metadata.
tool. The key tool contains information regarding the static anal-
ysis tool that performed the analysis and produced the report. Its
self-descriptive keys are shown in Listing 13.
resources. The resources key contains resource objects such as
localized items such as rule metadata and message strings associ-
ated with the rules. This prevents data duplication if, for example,
multiple warnings refer to the same rule. Each rule object contains
rule information such as rule id, rule description, and message
strings. This is illustrated in Listing 14. Note that the subkeys mes-
sageStrings and richMessageStrings contain all of themessageStrings
and richMessageStrings of the result objects (Listing 14).
4 FROM THE COGNICRYPT REPORTING
FORMAT TO SARIF
In this section, we detail our approach for converting CogniCrypt
results to the Sarif format, following the requirements of Section I.2
of the SARIF documentation4 [10]. To illustrate our implementation,
we use the example CogniCrypt report in Listing 15 obtained after
analysing an example file from CogniCrypt: Examples.jar5. The
listing contains two warnings: a ConstraintError (lines 297-299)
and a TypestateError (lines 303-305). Listings 16– 17 are snippets
of the same report in Sarif format, with the latter describing the
warnings, and the former containing all of the remaining data and
metadata.
4.1 Mapping CogniCrypt Data to Sarif Keys
To write a Sarif exporter for CogniCrypt, it is important to first
identify which information to export from the CogniCrypt error
format. We detail this information in this section.
4http://docs.oasis-open.org/sarif/sarif/v2.0/csprd01/sarif-v2.0-csprd01.html#
_Toc517436281
5https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis/blob/master/
CryptoAnalysisTargets/CogniCryptDemoExample/Examples.jar
263 "tool": {
264 "name": "CodeScanner",
265 "fullName": "CodeScanner 1.1 for Unix (en-US)",
266 "version": "2.1",
267 "semanticVersion": "2.1.0",
268 "language": "en-US",
269 "properties": {
270 "copyright": "Copyright (c) 2017 by Example
↪→ Corporation.
271 All rights reserved ."
272 }
273 },
Listing 13: Subkeys of the key tools in Sarif
274 "resources":
275 {
276 "rules": {
277 "C2001": {
278 "id": "C2001",
279 "shortDescription": {
280 "text": "A variable was used without being
↪→ initialized ."
281 },
282 "fullDescription": {
283 "text": "A variable was used without being
↪→ initialized. This can result in
↪→ runtime errors such as null
↪→ reference exceptions ."
284 },
285 "messageStrings": {
286 "default": "Variable \"{0}\" was used
↪→ without being initialized ."
287 },
288 "richMessageStrings": {
289 "richText": "Variable `{0}` was used without
↪→ being initialized ."
290 }
291 }
292 }
293 }
Listing 14: Subkeys of the key resources in Sarif
The first level of the Sarif JSON hierarchy contains the version
and $schema information. In our implementation, this data is pop-
ulated based on the current Sarif version: 2.0.0 (Listing 16 line
307), and its respective schema reference (Listing 16 line 308). This
information is hardcoded in our converter.
To fill the runs information (Listing 16 line 309), we map the
following data found in the CogniCrypt error format to the keys
of the Sarif format:
• tool contains static information on CogniCrypt. The infor-
mation to this key, such as semanticVersion, version, fullName,
and language (Listing 16 lines 311-314) is fetched from a hard-
coded configuration file in our converter: SARIFConfig6.
• files data is available from the existing CogniCrypt re-
porter: CommandLineReporter7. The value for the key is
fetched from the fully qualified name reported in line 294,
6https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis/blob/develop/CryptoAnalysis/
src/main/java/crypto/reporting/SARIFConfig.java
7https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis/blob/master/CryptoAnalysis/
src/main/java/crypto/reporting/CommandLineReporter.java
6
294 Findings in Java Class:
↪→ example.TypestateErrorExample
295
296 in Method: getPrivateKey
297 ConstraintError violating CrySL rule for
↪→ KeyPairGenerator (on Object
↪→ #9367df75558b10b537d558f11cb 7
↪→ a523f082e7e256ab7ba827a36db283cf940e)
298 First parameter (with value 1024) should be
↪→ any of {2048, 4096}
299 at line: 29
300
301
302 in Method: main
303 TypestateError violating CrySL rule for
↪→ Signature (on Object
↪→ #9c822ffdf2268ba2e0ff61f394b200
↪→ a7510d25a3d4a558ae811e624191c3583b)
304 Unexpected call to method sign on object of
↪→ type java.security.Signature. Expect a
↪→ call to one of the following methods
↪→ initSign,update
305 at line: 24
Listing 15: Example CogniCrypt output
and can be seen in line 317. Since CogniCrypt only sup-
ports Java projects,mimeType is hardcoded to a default value:
text/java, as shown in line 318.
• results is populated from the information available from
the current CogniCrypt report format. An example is
shown in Listing 17. For the ConstraintError reported in
line 297, locations.physicalLocation.fileLocation.uri and ful-
lyQualifiedName are fetched from lines 294 and 296; lo-
cations.physicalLocation.fileLocation.region.startLine is ob-
tained from line 299; ruleId, message.text and mes-
sage.richText are populated from lines 297 and 298.
• resources are illustrated shown in Listing 16 from line 322.
The different types of rules reported by CogniCrypt are lo-
cated in the package crypto.analysis.errors8. For each
of those errors, a fullDescription is retrieved from the config-
uration file SARIFConfig9.
• logicalLocations are not available in CogniCrypt. Currently,
CogniCrypt only reports an error at the line where it
was detected and not the complete witness path of the
warning. The information could be generated in the class
ErrorMarkerListener10, and then, exported in Sarif.
• invocations is not implemented in our connector, but can
be retrieved from CogniCrypt. The commandLine, work-
ingDirectory, startTime, and endTime are stored in the class
HeadlessCryptoScanner11, and the toolNotifications are
generated in the class CommandLineReporter12.
8https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis/tree/master/CryptoAnalysis/
src/main/java/crypto/analysis/errors
9https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis/blob/develop/CryptoAnalysis/
src/main/java/crypto/reporting/SARIFConfig.java
10https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis/blob/develop/CryptoAnalysis/
src/main/java/crypto/reporting/ErrorMarkerListener.java
11https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis/blob/develop/CryptoAnalysis/
src/main/java/crypto/HeadlessCryptoScanner.java
12https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis/blob/develop/CryptoAnalysis/
src/main/java/crypto/reporting/CommandLineReporter.java
306 {
307 "version": "2.0.0",
308 "$schema":
↪→ "http://json.schemastore.org/sarif -2.0.0",
309 "runs": [{
310 "tool": {
311 "semanticVersion": "1.0.0",
312 "fullName": "CogniCrypt (en-US)",
313 "language": "en-US",
314 "version": "1.0.0"
315 },
316 "files": {
317 "example/TypestateErrorExample.java": {
318 "mimeType": "text/java"
319 }
320 },
321 "results": [...],
322 "resources": {
323 "rules": {
324 "TypestateError": {
325 "id": "TypestateError",
326 "fullDescription": {
327 "text": "The ORDER block of CrySL is
↪→ violated, i.e., the expected
↪→ method sequence call to be made
↪→ is incorrect. For example, a
↪→ Signature object expects a call
↪→ to initSign(key) prior to
↪→ update(data)."
328 }
329 },
330 "ConstraintError": {
331 "id": "ConstraintError",
332 "fullDescription": {
333 "text": "A constraint of a CrySL rule is
↪→ violated, e.g., a key is
↪→ generated with the wrong key
↪→ size."
334 }
335 },
336 }
337 },
338 }]
339 }
Listing 16: Sarif output example for Listing 15 (1/2)
4.2 Implementation Details
Our implementation of the CogniCrypt–Sarif converter is in-
tegrated in the CogniCrypt repository [8] and can be enabled
by using the --sarifReport option and specifying a directory to
store the generated report using --reportDir option. An example
is shown at line 37 of Listing 5.
The results of CogniCrypt are available through the class
crypto.reporting.ErrorMarkerListener. Each object of this
class contains an errorMarkers field containing all warnings. The
main class of our converter is crypto.reporting.SARIFReporter,
which extends ErrorMarkerListener. In this class, we have over-
ridden the method afterAnalysis(), in which we iterate through
the CogniCryptwarnings and convert them into Sarif. Since Cog-
niCrypt stores its results in a Google Guava Table, the complexity
of our connector is linear with respect to the number of findings.
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341 "results": [
342 {
343 "locations": [{
344 "physicalLocation": {
345 "fileLocation": {
346 "uri": "example/TypestateErrorExample.java"
347 },
348 "region": {
349 "startLine": 29
350 }
351 },
352 "fullyQualifiedLogicalName":
↪→ "example::TypestateErrorExample::
↪→ getPrivateKey"
353 }],
354 "ruleId": "ConstraintError",
355 "message": {
356 "text": "First parameter (with value 1024)
↪→ should be any of {2048, 4096}.",
357 "richText": "ConstraintError violating CrySL
↪→ rule for KeyPairGenerator ."
358 }
359 }, {
360 " locations": [{
361 "physicalLocation": {
362 "fileLocation": {
363 "uri": "example/TypestateErrorExample.java"
364 },
365 "region": {
366 "startLine": 24
367 }
368 },
369 "fullyQualifiedLogicalName":
↪→ "example::TypestateErrorExample::main"
370 }],
371 "ruleId": "TypestateError",
372 "message": {
373 "text": "Unexpected call to method sign on
↪→ object of type
↪→ java.security.Signature. Expect a call
↪→ to one of the following methods
↪→ initSign,update .",
374 "richText": "TypestateError violating CrySL
↪→ rule for Signature ."
375 }
376 }]
Listing 17: Sarif output example for Listing 15 (2/2)
4.3 Evaluation
We verified the implementation of ourCogniCrypt converter using
an online Sarif validator13 [1]. The validator takes the generated
Sarif file as the input, scans over it, and communicates the for-
mat issues when the generated Sarif report does not follow the
standard specified in [10]. We generated the Sarif files for all of
the CogniCrypt test cases14, including the one used in this report
(Listings 16 and 17). The validation of the Sarif format passed.
A threat to validity is that the validator was in beta-testing phase
at the time. Thus, in addition, we manually verified the JSON format
of our reports according to the Sarif standard. All of our Sarif
reports were correct.
13http://sarifweb.azurewebsites.net
14https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we explored how to convert the CogniCrypt error
format into the more general Sarif format. After detailing the two
formats, we detailed our implementation. In our evaluation, we
confirmed the correctness of our converter on the CogniCrypt test
cases. The current implementation of our connector is available on-
line as part of the official CogniCrypt implementation on GitHub
[8]. Since this is an initial prototype, there is still room for improve-
ment. One such improvements is to finish the implementation of
the converter to include invocation and logical location informa-
tion. Another improvement concerns the CogniCrypt error format,
which does not encode as many details as it could. For example
call-graph information is available in the analysis and could be
encoded in Sarif, but the data is lost through the CogniCrypt
report. The connector can be improved to retrieve the information
directly from the analysis. As a follow-up to this work, CogniCrypt
also needs a full support for Sasp, since it is now able to export its
results in Sarif.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was conducted under the supervision of Eric Bodden
as part of the Secure Systems Engineering seminar at Paderborn
University, organized by Lisa Nguyen Quang Do. It was partially
funded by the Heinz Nixdorf Foundation and by the NRW Research
Training Group on Human Centered Systems Security (nerd.nrw).
REFERENCES
[1] [n. d.]. http://sarifweb.azurewebsites.net
[2] Inc. FireEye. [n. d.]. https://www.fireeye.com/ online, 12. April 2019.
[3] Micro Focus. [n. d.]. https://www.microfocus.com online, 12. April 2019.
[4] GrammaTech. 2018. Static Analysis Results: A Format and
a Protocol: SARIF & SASP. https://blogs.grammatech.com/
static-analysis-results-a-format-and-a-protocol-sarif-sasp
[5] Inc. GrammaTech. [n. d.]. https://www.grammatech.com online, 12. April 2019.
[6] Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE). [n. d.]. https://www.hpe.com online, 12.
April 2019.
[7] https://www.microsoft.com. [n. d.]. https://semmle.com online, 12. April 2019.
[8] Sriteja Kummita. [n. d.]. https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis/
pull/106 online, 25. January 2019.
[9] Cryptsoft Pty Ltd. [n. d.]. https://www.cryptsoft.com online, 12. April 2019.
[10] OASIS. 2018. Static Analysis Results Interchange Format (SARIF) Version 2.0.
http://docs.oasis-open.org/sarif/sarif/v2.0/csprd01/sarif-v2.0-csprd01.html
[11] Stefan Krüger, Sarah Nadi, Michael Reif, Karim Ali, Mira Mezini, Eric Bodden,
Florian Göpfert, Felix Günther, Christian Weinert, Daniel Demmler, Ram Ka-
math. 2016. Jumping Through Hoops: Why do Java Developers Struggle With
Cryptography APIs? In International Conference for Software Engineering (2016),
935–946.
[12] Stefan Krüger, Sarah Nadi, Michael Reif, Karim Ali, Mira Mezini, Eric Bodden,
Florian Göpfert, Felix Günther, Christian Weinert, Daniel Demmler, Ram Kamath.
2017. CogniCrypt: Supporting Developers in using Cryptography. In International
Conference on Automated Software Engineering (2017).
[13] Semmle. [n. d.]. https://semmle.com online, 12. April 2019.
[14] CA Technologies. [n. d.]. https://www.ca.com online, 12. April 2019.
[15] D. Lazar, H. Chen, X. Wang and N. Zeldovich. [n. d.]. Why does cryptographic
software fail?: a case study and open problems. In ACM Asia-Pacific Workshop
on Systems ([n. d.]).
8
A CRYSL RULES
A.1 KeyGenerator
378 SPEC javax.crypto.KeyGenerator
379 OBJECTS
380 int keySize;
381 java.security.spec.AlgorithmParameterSpec params;
382 javax.crypto.SecretKey key;
383 java.lang.String alg;
384 java.security.SecureRandom ranGen;
385
386 EVENTS
387 g1: getInstance(alg);
388 g2: getInstance(alg , _);
389 Gets := g1 | g2;
390
391 i1: init(keySize);
392 i2: init(keySize , ranGen);
393 i3: init(params);
394 i4: init(params , ranGen);
395 i5: init(ranGen);
396 Inits := i1 | i2 | i3 | i4 | i5;
397
398 gk: key = generateKey ();
399
400 ORDER
401 Gets , Inits?, gk
402
403 CONSTRAINTS
404 alg in {"AES", "HmacSHA224", "HmacSHA256",
↪→ "HmacSHA384", "HmacSHA512"};
405 alg in {"AES"} => keySize in {128, 192, 256};
406
407 REQUIRES
408 randomized[ranGen ];
409
410 ENSURES
411 generatedKey[key , alg];
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